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September 30, 1985 Conference
Surrmer List 21 , Sheet 1
No. 84-1979
PS FS Savings Bank, FSB
(former employer)
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Ce rt.
son,
[DJ])

v.
Vinson
(Title VII plaintiff)

to~Robi n- z:Z_£,_..,

Wri~__::...Northrop

,.., ...._/-

~~~-- ~ L4-A.JfJ~J-. L

~~~~~

Federal/Civi 1

~

T1mely

~~k_,p

Jl~n-~.
A..cfc..
1.

SUMMARY:

Petrs challenge

the CADC's

(1) resp alleged sufficient facts to state

i!'ADG
claim of sex discrimination;
/

cone usions

~ cogniza

J.cc~

le Title VII

1"1....-f-

any discriminatory

ctivity by a

~f

resp' s voluntary participation in work place sexual activity
..__ ---..

is

to

t~e

that

evid:nce

supervisor is

~ble

(2)

.. -

employer;

~c

and

(3) ,

.

'

)-e)

-,(.-

2.

I

Resp met petr Taylor,

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

vice-

president of petr PSFS and manager of one of its branch offices,
and

applied

for

a

job.

After

filling out an application,

was hired as a teller-trainee under Taylor's supervision.

fJY1-

p

~

----

fte r,

she was p ·

{f)

.\

assistant branch manager.
ment was

solely a

There-

cv
and ultimately

- ~ -------

teller ~ ad teller,

. to

resp

It is undisputed that resp's advanceResp worked

function of merit.

"

It

for

petr

for

----

four years, when she took indefinite sick leave.

Petr fired her

two months later for excessive use of that leave.
"-----------~

Resp then brought this action under Title VII, alleging sex'"'
ual discrimination in the form of sexual harassment b

----.

her original complaint, resp also alleged violations of the Fifth
Amendment and

u.s.c.

42

§

1985(2).

These claims were abandoned

on appeal.
Conflicting testimony was presented at trial.
that

Taylor

had made

sexual advances

to

which

Resp claimed
she

ultimately

yielded because she feared that refusal would jeopardize her job.

-..,
She was then forced to have sex with Taylor both during and after

I

bu~ r

to

resp,

make

s and both on and off the bank premises.

Taylor

would

fondle

her

in front

According

of other employees,

lewd remarks, and would follow her to the women's restroom

and expose himself to her.
ployees.

He would also fondle other women em-

-

She also claimed that Taylor forcibly raped her on more

than one occasion.

These activities stopped once resp began see-

ing her boyfriend.

Resp never complained to any bank official,

"

-

::::;:>-r

~

e-

~

cq

=>-: •

filed a grievance, or reported being attacked to the police.

-.j-

Taylor

denied engaging in any of this activity, and claimed

that resp brought such charges against him in retaliation for a
business-related dispute.

The bank asserted that it was unaware
---,
-of any sexual misconduct or harassment by Taylor, and that if any
such conduct was performed,
bank.

~

·

by the

Finally, both Taylor and the bank presented evidence that

resp often wore provocative clothing at work, entertained bizarre
sexual fantasies, and continually volunteered intimate details of
her sex life to other employees.
Th e
found

Ere

.
d 1str1ct

that

resp

harassment

(;r.

court

had

(giving

Penn

,

held

not been subject

sex

as

for

petrs.

in sexual

~ voluntary

relations

a condition of employment)

-

with Taylor,

their

If resp did

rel"~tionship

was

not job-re l ated.
The court al::;o found that
~ -- ~
was without notice of any unlawful conduct, and could
'

- - -·--

-------~

s~,

The court did not fault the

but noted that Title VII also provides a remedy for pervaon-the-job sexual harassment,

--

loss

of

job benefits

independent ~ f

any t.,..h reatened

("hostile environment" sexual harassment).

The CAOC also held that any d iscrirninatory activity by Taylor was
( attributable to the bank.
----

rulings:

(1)

;=;,

Finally, the CA made two evidentiary

:::: ,...,

evidence of resp's "sartorial or whimsical procliv-

ities" was immaterial; and

~~
J...~

!~AJ,.
"'""·"'-t

~

.

district judge's finding of no "quid pro quo" sexual d iscri rnination,

~J..~

?

not be held liabl e.
The CADC reversed and remanded.

4)~

and could

and

c:=:

the bank

court

to "quid pro quo" sexual

not come under the protection afforded by Title VII.
engage

The

(2) on remand, resp should be allowed

'

(

to

introduce evidence

that Taylor

sexually abused other female

employees.

----

The CAOC denied rehearing en bane.
cused

In dissent, J. Bork fo-

first on the panel's ruling that "a plaintiff's voluntariwith her supervi-

participating in a sexual relat' -

have no bearing on the pertinent inquiry in a sexual haThis

assment suit brought under Title VII."

holding "rigged"

the rules of evidence "so that dalliance is automatically harassment because

no

one

is

allowed

to deny it."

exception with the panel's imposition of
the bank for
consistent

the acts of a supervisor.

with

~

traditional

sors and employees

ing

harassment.
v.

Jackson,

there

1~r:-

to

took

and

~nel

's rule

forces

the

on

is in-

employer

hat all relationships between supervi-

Fetrs argue that the CADC erred in

cover

"hostile

environment"

claims

of

exten ~ -

sexual

Although the CAOC relied on its own ruling in Bundy
641 F.2d

934

(CAOC 1981)

is ro other case support for

cide whether

also

re entirely asexual."

CONTENTIONS:

'J'itle VII

law,

Bork

~ icarious liabilit ~
The

~
-r-- ----=~

into becoming "an

3.

tort

J.

this

to support its conclusion,

it, and this Court should de-

kind of harassment constitutes discrimination

for purposes of Title VII.
If Title VII does

apply

cannot be held vicariously
of

absolute

the CA3,

employer

Craig v.

Tompkins v.

Y

to this

type

liable for

of

suit,

the violation.

liability conflicts with
&

Y Snacks,

Public Service Elec.

Inc.,
&

This rule

the decisions of

721 F.2d

Gas Co.,

an employer

77

(CA3 1983);

568 F.2d 1044

(CA3

1977),

the CA4, Katz v.

Dole,

709 F.2d

251

CAll, Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d '987
Finally, the CAOC's ruling

(CA4 1983), and the
(CAll 1982).

that evidence of voluntary par-

ticipation in work-place sexual activity is immaterial to a Title
VII claim also conflicts with the rule
e.g.,

Henson,

254 n.3.

supra,

682 F.2d

at 903;

in other ci .. --!'
Katz, supra,

See,

709 F.2d

at

This holding precludes any defense on critical elements

of a Title VII action.
Resp contends that all sexual harassrnen t, whether "quid pro
quo" or "hostile environment", is prohibited under Title VII, and
every circuit

to have addressed this

issue agrees.

It

is also

consistent with Title VII law to hold the employer strictly lia-

(

-

ble for

acts of sexual harassment committed by supervisory per-

sonnel.

The alleged circuit split described by petrs simply does

not exist.

Even if a "notice requirement" for employer liability

is applied

in this case, however, the facts clearly support the

conclusion that the bank had both actual and constructive notice
of Taylor's misconduct.
Petrs misread the CAOC opinion on the voluntariness issue.
The court correctly insisted that the complaining employee in a
Title VI I
plained of
that

action rnus t
were

evidence

of

establish

un welcorn ed.
the

that

the sexual

The court did

plaintiff's

voluntary

advances

not hold,
sexual

corn-

therefore

conduct

was

i nad miss i ble.
4.

DISCUSSION:

a remedy for

In Bundy v.

--------

claim that Title VII does not afford

"hostile environment"

------- "'-

foundation.

~trs'

Jackson,

sexual harassment is without
641 F.2d 934

(CAOC

1981), the

-6-

CAOC reasoned that the "conditions of employment" protected under
'

rritle VII "include the psychological and emotional work environment."
(CAS

rd.

1971),

at

944,

cert.

citing,

denied,

~gers

v.

u.s.

406

EEOC,

957

454 F.2d

234,

It

(1972).

238

followed,

therefore, that "where an employer created or condoned a subs+tially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the
complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result
of the discrimination," Title VII had been violated.
44

(emphasis in original).

ment

thus

"terms,

amounts

"Hostile environment" sexual harass-

to sexual discrimination with respect

conditions

"quid pro quo"

Id. at 943-

or

privileges

of

employment"

no

to

less

the
than

The court concluded that any

sexual harassment.

other rule would allow an employer "sexually [to] harass a female
employee
[her ] ,

with

or

impunity

by

t a k i n g any other

sponse to her resistance."
'J'h is
cuits

t an g i b 1 e

stopping

short

ac t ions a g a i n s t

of
he r

firing
in

re -

Id. at 945.

reasoning has been endorsed by the only two other cir-

(CA4 and CAll)

Katz v.

carefully

Dole,

which

709 F.2d

have

251,

considered

254

this

(CA4 1983);

Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901, 903-905 (CAll 1982).

question.

Henson v.

See

City of

This developnent

is also consistent with EEOC Guidelines which provide that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,
verbal or

requests for sexual favors,

physical conduct of a

and other

sexual nature constitute sexual

harassment when .•• (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating,
ment."

29 C.F.R.

§

hostile

1604.11(a)

or offensive working environ-

(1985).

Given the uniform devel-

opnent of this area of the law, the issue does not appear to cert
worthy at this time.
There

is

a circuit
~

J(

ployer 's

split,

however, on the issue of an em-

;;;: ~,f\.

vicarious

liabi lity " lin a

"hostile

environment"

sexual
'---

In the instant case, the CADC held that "Title
ha r a s s men t sui t .
-....,
7'
VII imposes upon an employer without specific notice of sexual
harassment by supervisory personnel responsibility for
cies of discrimination."

The~ Henson,

App. at 12a.

Op.,

that spe-

V::

however, held that "where the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer

responsible for

the hostile environment created by the plain-

tiff's supervisor
should

have

known

she must
of

the harassment

take prompt remedial action."
I

Katz is
alleged

or

show that
in question and

failed

to

Henson, supra, 682 F.2d at 897.

inapplicable on this point, as the plaintiff there

a "hostile environment"

709

F.2d at

255.

Such claims are governed by separate vicarious li-

ability

regulations.

Compare

Similarly,

29

personnel.

supra,

not

.11 (c ) .

supervisory

Katz,

co-employees,

§ 16 04

by

as the result of actions by her

C.F.R

nearly all of

§

1604.ll(d)

with

the cases cited

petrs and resp are inapplicable to this discussion.

Id.

by both

'r.hese cases

involve "quid pro quo" claims of sexual harassment, not "hostile
environment" clairrs.

In that situation, the uniform rule

of strict liability for
ment

committed

by

their

employers for
supervisory

the acts of sexual harasspersonnel.

Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-606
cases) •

is one

See

(CA7 1985)

generally
(collecting

-tj-

I

The different holdings by the CAll and the CADC reflect fun--------~~---

ability in Title VII actions.
between "quid pro quo"

...........----

...........

In Henson, the CAll distinguished

and "hostile

environment" sexual harass-

men t in fashioning its vicarious liability rule under traditional
notions of respondeat superior.

In "quid pro quo" cases,

the supervisor relies upon his apparent or
actual authority to extort sexual consideration
fran an employee • . . . In that case, the supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose.
Because the supervisor is acting within at least
the apparent scope of the authority en trusted to
him by the employer when he makes his employment
decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to
the source of his authority.
rd. at 910.

These circ1.111stances justify the imposition of abso-

- .,te vicarious

liability for employers in "quid pro quo" sexual

harassment cases under Title VII.
In "hostile environment" claims, however, "[tJhe capacity of
any person
necessarily

to create a hostiJe
enhanced

or

or offensive

diminished

by

environment

any degree

which the employer confers upon that individual."
reasoned that,

not

of

authority

rd.

The CAll

by creating a hostile environment, the supervisor

acts outside the scope of his authority, and thus
cannot automatically be

"[h) is conduct

imputed to the employer any more so than

can the conduct of an ordinary employee."

Id.

The CADC completely rejected this reasoning.
fused

is

The court re- ci#OC:.

to rely on the tort concept of respondeat superior

struing Title VII cases.

in con-

The court found that common-law

tort

concepts are rot applicable, without clear Congressional authori-

-:7-

'

zation,

to interpret a statutory scheme designed to cure a spe-

cific evil.
tions,

Op., App. at 18a-19a, citing NLRB v. Hearst Publica-

Inc.,

322

u.s.

111,124-125

(1944).

On a broader level,

the court determined that "confining liability, as the common law
would do,
scope

to situations in which

of his

a supervisor

authority conceivably could

acted within the

lead to

the ludicrous

result that employers would become accountable only if they expl i ci tly require or consciously allow their s upe rvi sor s to molest
women employees."
his

Id. at 19a-20a.

immunity fran claims for

expedient of

looking

the

An employer could thus ensure

which he is unaware "by the simple

other

way,"

a

rule which

provides

an

incentive for employers rot to take a more active role in freeing
the work place from illegal sex discrimination.
Relyin., instead on the language of Title VII, the court not'--

ed that in
strict

liability on employers independent of

the alleged
1604.11 (c).
all

·quid pro quo" cases, the uniform rule was to impose

Id. at 15a, quoting 29 C.F.R.

sexual harassment.
The court saw

ro

their knowledge of

reason

not

to apply this rule

instances where Title VII applies to charges of

crimination,

in the same manner

as adopted

for

§

to

sexual dis-

"transgressions

arising out of racial or religious discrimination."

Id. at 16a.

The conflict between the CAll and the CADC is thus significant,

ooth

provides
clear

in reasoning and

---a proper

~

in the results achieved.

vehicle for

This case

..-.

resolving this conflict, as it is

that resp can only prevail under the strict liability ap-

proach adopted

by the CAre.

Despite

resp's contentions

contrary, there appears to be little, if any, evidence to

to the
indi-

-.L

I

v-

cate that the petr bank had either actual or constructive knowledge of petr Taylor's conduct to justify 'imposing liability under
the CAll's reasoning.

This issue is cert worthy.

The CAOC's evidentiary rulings
In that part of
the difference between
sexual harassment, am

are

the opinion,

"quid pro quo"
j

confusing,

but

rot cert

the court was explaining
and "hostile environment"

ndicating that the district court had not

properly considered resp's claims under the latter theory.
court found that
sexual

harassment

resp's]

"[i] f

the evidence war ran ted a

[under

'voluntariness'

the

had

"hostile

The

finding of

environment"

standard,

no materiality whatsoever."

Op.'

App. at 9a.
This seemingly absolute language, however,
j

is undercut lat-

er in the opinion where the court roted:
In deterrnin.tng the appropriateness of attribution, ero ugh specificity rnu st be irnpa r ted to 'harassment' to filter out personal relationships
that are rot products of employment-related inti rni da t ion.
For purposes of this case , we a re
well-served by the criteria reflected in the EEOC
Guidelines.
The touchstone of these cr i te ria is
that sexual advances rnus t be un ~1 come, and rnus t
in some way amount to an explicit or implicit
term cr condition of employment in the sense
e it he r of j o b status or wor k en vir o nrn en t .
Id.

at

17a

implies that

n. 68,

citing 29 C.F.R.

§

1604.11 (a).

This

an employer may still defend a Title VII charge of

sexual harassment by showing that the sexual advances
"un ~lcorne"
ployee) •

language

(i.e. ,

that

such

advances were wel corned

See Henson, supra, 682 F. 2d at 903.

by

were

not

the ern-

Given the internal

inconsistency on this issue within the opinion, the Court should

-.L .L -

I

allCM the CAOC to interpret its own holding on thjs issue before
expressing a view on its
5.

of

RECOMMENDA'l'ION:

appropriateness~

I

recommend granting cert on the issue

supervisory liability for

•
Title

"hostile

c::::!'L'----.___________..

t.__:

crirninatiort

VII.

environment"

sexual dis-

-------...

I

reco:rrrrnend denial on the

other

issues.
There is a response.

September 1, 198 5

Schultz

Opin in petn.

March 18, 1986
PSFS GINA-POW
84-1979

PSFS Savings Bank Associatioin v. Mechelle Vinson
{CADC)
To be argued March 25

MEMO TO BOB:
This is a case in which CADC
Northrop
Title

(district judge)),

VII

Although

violation
the

found petitioner guilty of a

because

petition

(Robinson, Wright, and

and

of

sex

various

questions somewhat differently,

I

discrimination.

briefs

state

the

think the amicus brief

by the SG perhaps best identifies the questions presented.
I

will

not,

questions

in

this

uniquely

in full detail.

brief

Rather,

memo,

identify

the

it may be helpful to

you if I state first my tentative views:
1.
have

CADC held

been

employees

that where

made

by

the

result

environment",

a

supervisor

SG

an

be

an

subordinate
"offensive

female
work

There is a split of authority on

I am inclined to agree, however, with the

(actually EEOC)

such

may

to

sexual advances

that constitutes employee discrimination in

violation of Title VII.
this question.

unwelcome

offensive

that where there is adequate proof of
working

environment,

there

is

a

violation of Title VII.
findings

of

the

DC,

On the basis of my reading of the

I

do

not

think

there

was

adequate

proof of any such environment in this case.
2.
a

The second question identified by the SG also is

factual

one.

I

have

read

the

findings

of

fact

explicitly made in a rather c areful opinion by the DC . At
least on their face,
the

DC

in

favor

these facts support the judgment of
of

petitioner,

and

respondent's complaint with prejudice.

dismissal

The DC found,

of
in

addition to other facts, the following:

•

( i) •

alone,

Respondent's

and

not

as

a

promotions
result

of

were
sexual

based

on

favors

merit
to

her

supervisor Taylor or anyone else.
( i i) •

If the plaintiff and Taylor engaged in sexual

relationships,
plaintiff

"that relationship was a voluntary one by

having

nothing

to

do

with

her

continued

employment at Capital or her advancements or promotions at
that institution."
(iii).
by

Raises, bonuses and promotions were determined

officials

only made

of

the Association,

writ ten

respondent's

recommendations.

employment,

she

and

not by Taylor who

Moreover,

received

the

throughout
usual

and

customary increases in salary, bonuses and promotions "on
the basis of merit".
(iv).
grievance

The

petitioner's Employee Manual

procedure

grievance and have

whereby

any

it resolved,

employee

provides

may

state

a
a

if not by a supervisor,

then by the division head or the president.
(v).
grievance

Respondent "never filed" an informal or formal
against

defendant,

Taylor,

pursuant

to

the

Employee Manual.
(vi).
association

The
is

"expressed
one

of

policy

of

the

defendant

in

employment

non-discrimination

practices."
(vii) •
EEOC

"No female employment of petitioner

complaint

or

formal

grievance

'filed an

procedure

charging

defendant Taylor with sexual harrassment during the period
in question'"; and finally
(viii).

Respondent

harrassment

and

was

was

"not

not

the

the

victim
victim

of

sexual
sexual

of

discrimination" during her employment.
Although I must reread the opinion of CADC, and also
that of Judge Bork
not

think

these

the

findings

(with which I generally agree),

court
to

be

of

appeals

clearly

expressly

erroneous.

found

I do

any

Rather,

of

more

generally, it considered the entire scope of such evidence
to be
not

irrelevant or inadmissible.
clear

to

me

inconsistencies

in

For reasons certainly

(particularly
its

in

opinion},

view

CADC

of

some

to

have

seem

accepted respondent's opinion testimony that there was an
"offensive working environment" and that once this finding
was

made,

(Bob:

the

facts

found

the

DC

were

irrelevant.

I would particularly like your comments on this}.
3.

whether

Finally,
(Bob:

perhaps the most important question is
Ginny

tells

dictation did not record.
My

by

tentative

view

is

to

I

me

the

remainder

of

my

will not try to repeat it.

reverse,

but

I

consider - as always - a different view.)
LFP, Jr.

remain

open

to

rbs 03/24/86

From:

Bob

No.84-1979

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

~~~
TO BE ARGUED: Tuesday, March 25, 1986

~i::()

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether creation of an "offensive working environment" independent of any loss of promotion or other pecuniary harm states a
cause of action for sex discrimination under Title VII.

Whether

an employer

is liable under Title VII for sexual harassment by

supervisors

which

create

a

discriminatory

working

even where the employer is unaware of such conduct.
dence

of

complainant's

dress,

conduct,

and

environment
Whether evi-

proclivities

along

page 2.

with the

voluntar iness of her

acti viti
, es

are admissible

in de-

fense of a Title VII claim.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1974 appellant Mechelle Vinson obtained a job at appellee
Capital City Federal Savings Bank through Sidney L. Taylor, who
was a vice president of appellee.

Respondent began her employ-

ment as a teller-trainee, and thereafter was promoted successively to teller, head teller, and finally to assistant branch manager.

Respondent worked in the branch for four years, after which
--~

she took indefinite sick-leave which ultimately led to her dismissal for excessive use of that leave.
Respondent

then

brought

an

action

against

Taler

and

the

bank, alleging that she had been victimized by sex discrimination
in the form of sexual harassment by Taylor in violation of Title
VII. At trial, the evidence bearing on Taylor's behavior towards
Vinson was sharply contrasting.

Respondent claimed that Taylor

and Vinson had sex numerous times both at the bank and away from
it, with respondent going along merely out of fear of reprisal.
Respondent
sometimes

testified
violent,

to

several

other

sexually

demeaning,

and

acts on the part of Taylor directed towards

respondent as well as other women.

Taylor denied that he ever

had any sexual relations with respondent;

he claimed that these

charges were aired in retaliation for a work-related dispute.
Review of this case is hampered somewhat by the unorthodox

-

form of opinion used by the DC.

Rather than making clearly la-

beled finding of facts, and then applying the facts found to the
law as

it understood

it,

the opinion discusses one legal

issue

page -'•

relevant here,

which

is whether

the employer had notice of the

~

'

harassment. The DC found that the employer had no notice of the
harassment

at

issue.

Specifically,

it

----respondent's
.........

rejected

claim that notice to Mr. Taylor a supervisor, was notice to the
bank.

Because it held there was no notice to the bank,

the DC

concluded that the bank could not be held liable for the acts of
Taylor.

The DC then goes on to make additional findings of fact

which are unrelated to any legal discussion found in the opinion.
Of those findings,
case here:

the following

are arguably relevant to this

Respondent's advancement was achieved solely on the

basis of merit; raises and bonuses were not determined by Taylor,
and,

in

any

event,

respondent

received

the

usual

amounts

of

these; respondent never availed herself of any bank procedures to
complain about the harassment.

/

In addition, the DC found

If the plaintiff and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship during the time of plaintiff's employment with Capital, that relationship was a
vo ~y one by plaintiff having nothing to do with
her continued employment at Capital or her advancement
or promotions at that institution.
As pointed out by amici AFL-CIO, et al. this latter finding
is somewhat remarkable in that it simply avoids a central credibili ty issue of
took place,

the case, which

and the

is whether such a relationship

finding comports with neither the story of

Taylor--who claimed that no relationship took place, nor that of
respondent who claimed that only an unwelcome one took place.l

lAFL-CIO point out that the CA was possibly unable to review
this fact as clearly erroneous because it did not have a total
transcript, due apparently to the fact that the DC denied
respondent's IFP request for a transcript.
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What

made

course,

the

Court

of

Appeals'

even

job more

difficult,

q.

of

is that the DC never bothered to give its understanding

of what the applicable law is in a sexual harassment case.
"findings of fact"

These

are merely followed by the conclusory state-

ment that no Title VII violation occurred here.
The

v/

Court

of

Appeals

reversed.

claims come in two varieties:
~ .E!..Q"

It

noted

that

Title

VII

there is the garden variety "quid

claim in which a plaintiff asserts that sexual favors

were required in order for the plaintiff to retain a job, achieve
a promotion, etc.
plained

-

ment.

that

This is not such a case.

Rather, the CA ex-

respondent's claim was one for

for

sexual harass-

In a sexual harassment case, the issue is whether Taylor

"created or condoned a substantially ~ iscriminatory work environ"'ment, regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any

-

t angible

job benefits

as

a result of

7a, citing Bundy v. Jackson,
The CA noted

that

the discrimination." App.

641 F.2d 934, 943-944

the DC did not

undertake

(CADC 1981).

a determination on

whether a Title VII violation of this nature occurred, and that a
remand was proper

on this

issue.2

TheCA added, however,

that ??

the voluntariness of respondent's behavior in a sexual harassment
case was

immaterial.

It further mentioned

in a

footnote,

that

~

evidence

of

respondent's

place in this litigation."

dress

and

personal

fantasies

"had

no

In addition, it concluded that the DC

2of course, this is also understandable in that Bundy had not
been decided when the DC ruled, and this case was so long on
appeal (3 years from argument to panel decision) that the law
clarified significantly.
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had erred

in not permitting

responde~t

~.

to elicit evidence from

other women of how Taylor had treated them.
The CA also reversed with respect to employer liability on
the

notice

issue.

The CA

held

that

employers must answer

for

sexual harassment of any subordinate by any supervising superior.
First, Title VII expressly defines an employer as including the
employer's agents. Second, it relied very slightly on some legislative history.
Finally,

it

Third, The EEO Guidelines support such a view.

noted

that

neither

the

statutory

language

nor

its

legislative history suggested that sex discrimination should be
treated any differently from racial or religious discrimination,
and "the case law in these latter areas establishes beyond cavil
that an employer

is chargeable with Title VII

violations occa-

sioned by discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel" App.
16a (quotation omitted). In addition, supervisors are not limited
to those who can hire, promote, or fire;
direct
and

employees

to

recommend

in their

work,

personnel

rather, "the ability to

to evaluate their

actions

carries

performances

attendant

power

to

coerce, intimidate and harass."
II. DISCUSSION
I

am frankly

somewhat

case worth participating in.

surprised

that

the SG

found

subsequent cour
issue is a

a

Judge Bork was clearly correct that

the evidentiary rulings of the CADC were wrong, but I

ability"

this

that out.

think any

The "strict li-

bit of a tempest in a teapot given that in

cases where there has been no firing, demotion, etc, the most a
victorious

plaintiff

can

receive

is

an

injunction

against

the

?
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employer telling it to correct the

o~fensive

environment.

This

is not a case that leaves employers open to large compensatory or
punitive damage claims, as they are forbidden by Title VII.

Fi-

nally, whether Ms. Vinson loses or wins here or on remand with
respect

to

the

facts

hardly

seems

worth

the

SG's--or

~

this

Court's--time.
A. The existence of a cause of action for harassment.
You indicated in your memo to file that you have no trouble
concluding, as the SG does, that a cause of action exists where
actions of supervisors create an "offensive work environment."
agree with this,

and believe it is supported by the plain lan-

guage of Title VII, and the purpose behind it.
that

I

petitioner's

argument

I will add simply

that Title VII was meant

to remedy

merely tangible "economic" harms such as loss of job, etc, does
not support its view that the creation of an offensive work envi-

~~

ronment should not state a Title VII violation.

Clearly, were a
I(

significant

number

of

employers

to permit

their

workplaces

to

become sexually, racially, or religiously offensive, there is no
doubt

that,

as

a practical matter,

jobs would be foreclosed to

the offended who would be unwilling to submit themselves to such
terms

of

employment--and

Title VII

expressly

prohibits,

inter

alia, discrimination in terms or conditions of employment.

Ac-

ceptance of petitioner's view would mean that all sorts of sexual
harassment could be carried on with impunity as long as the subject is never fired, demoted, etc. That is silly.
is absolutely no reason for d'
racial or religious har

Finally, there

sexual harassment from

page

of Dundee,

682 F.2d 897,

901

1~82);

{CAll

1.

Bundy v. Jackson, 641

F.2d 934, 943-44 {CADC 1981).
In the event the Court agrees that sexual harassment states
a claim under Title VII, I believe that the EEO Guidelines state
an

acceptable

definition:

"unwelcome

sexual

advances,

requests

for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when", inter alia, "such
conduct

has

the

purpose

or

effect

of

unreasonably

interfering

with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,

hostile,

or

offensive

working

environment,"

29

u.s.c.

§1604.11.
B. Employer Liability
The

important

issue

in

this

case,

I

think,

is whether

an

employer can be held liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor
absent notice to the employer of such harassment. Certain briefs
argue that this issue need not be reached until there is a finding of 1 iabil i ty.

I disagree because a decision that there can

be no liability imputed to the bank would preclude the necessity
of a remand on the factual issues in the case.
The petr's main argument is that without notice to the employer there can be no finding of intent. That begs the question
because
needs

the

issue

to have

here

the

The SG takes petr' s

is which

intent

representative

in order

of

the

company

to find the company 1 iable.

side on this issue beginning with the idea

that the Act uses the term "agent," but noting that an "agent" is
deemed one only insofar as he acts within the scope of his authority.

The SG, however, makes two critical admissions.

First,

he admits that agency principles are not carried wholesale into
Title VII

analysis.

Second,

he admits

that where a supervisor

fires a worker for sexual reasons, the employer is liable regardless of its awareness of the behavior, even though a strong argument can be made that firings for sexual reasons are beyond the
scope of the agent's authority and therefore the employer should
not be liable.

Therefore,

the term agency to be weak.
er' s

agent when he

I

find the SG' s

argument resting on

Just as a supervisor is the employ-

is empowered to hire,

fire,

etc. ,

he would

seem to be no less the employer's agent when it comes to dealing
with subordinates or creating a working atmosphere. See Henson v.
City of Dundee,
senting).

682 F.2d 897,

913

(CAll 1982)

(Clark, J.,

dis-

The SG proposes the following rule that asks whether

procedures were available to an employee and whether

they were

utilized, and the company was "reasonably responsive to the complaint." Only if this procedure was followed or there is actual
knowledge could the employer be found liable.
I recommend that you reject the SG's view on notice.

--------------------------------------------

it is inconsistent with Title VII law in any other area.
admits that if this were a quid

~ ~

liable for the supervisor's activity here.
religious

First,
The SG

case the bank would be
If it were a race or

atmosphere case liability would apparently be imputed

to the employer. 3

Second,

the SG makes no attempt to justify

3I do not rely too heavily on thi argument. Several cases
from the race area involve firi s, thus they are not analogous
to a case in which there the of ense is limited to creating an
offensive working environment.
In addition, those cases that do
exist, of course, are not di ositive because this Court has not
(Footnote continued)

we,!

page
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special treatment for sex discrimination cases except to say that
enforcement

is difficult

are not abusive.

because a

lot of sexual

relationships

That does not justify a policy that leads to

excusing a hostile working environment in cases in which the victims are truly offended or abused.
good pol icy,

In addition, even if it is a

the SG should address

those concerns

to Congress,

because the statute this Court is asked to interpret indicates in
no way that sexual harassment claims are to be treated different
from

other Title VII

claims.

Indeed

Congress,

indicated

that

"discrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination."

s.

Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st

Sess. 7 (1971), quoted in Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 606
(CA7 1985).

Third, the SG's fear that the CADC's rule will lead
..::..__

to interference in private matters on the part of employers seems
misplaced.

Courts

can

separate

abusive

situations

from

non-

abusive ones, which would have been evident here if the District
Court
does

had

explained

itself

properly.

Fourth,
____.

the

not open up employers to endless financial

cases in which there has been no firing,
demotion, the remedy is simply injunctive.

CADC' s

liability.

rule
In

failure to promote, or
Fifth, the SG's rule

is, in effect, an exhaustion requirement nowhere suggested in the
statute,

and one which,

I think, has the potential for creating

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
yet ruled on liability for the acts of a supervisor in the areas
of race and religion in harassment cases.
I would simply suggest
that there is no reason to distinguish sex cases from race or
religion cases with respect to liability for the acts of a
supervisor.
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endless confusion on the meaning of
employer

from

its

supervisors,

li~bility.

it would

be

By separating the
unclear

whose acts

-

could constitute a Title VII violation.4

Sixth, a rule requir-

ing notice in such situations causes needless confusion in anether

respect.

sorts.

Such

A

"constructive

a

claim

is

discharge"

that

case

harassment

got

is
so

a

hybrid

of

bad

that

the

claimant was forced to quit--not that she was fired due to failure to acquiesce.

I can see no reason for imputing liability to

the

case where

employer

in a

a

worker

is wrongfully fired--an

imposition of liability on the employer with which the SG agreesand

not

imputing

it

where

harassment

is

so

bad

one

has

no

choice but to quit. Once such a distinction is rejected, it requires little to say that there is no reason to wait until a situation gets so bad that an employee has to quit before an injunction can issue against the employer.
that the approach

Seventh, the SG's statement

in the brief is simply an elaboration of the

---

approach taken by the EEOC seems flatly wrong.

Those regulations

provide, as pointed out by the CADC:

"Applying general Title VII principles, an employer
is responsible for its acts and those of its
agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the
employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
4For example, the SG's brief argues that "the gravamen of a
'hostile environment' claim is that the employer has improperly
tolerated a sexually discriminatory atmosphere." SG's Brief at
29. Accepting that as true would mean that after notice to the
Bank here, the focus of a lawsuit would be on how the bank acted,
rather than on how Mr. Taylor acted prior to and subsequent to
the notice. There is no reason to complicate a determination of
liability to this degree.

page ll.

should have known of their
§l604.ll(c) (emphasis added).

oc~urrence."

29

C.F.R.

Finally, as respondent points out, if the Bank is not liable, and if the individual's liability is unclear because he is
not,~

an individual,

the employer for purposes of Title VII,

then some acts of discrimination go unrernedied.
C.

The

"voluntariness"

finding

of

the DC

and Evidentiary

Issues
Recall that the CA stated that the issue in a sexual harass-

-

--

rnent case is whether T~or "created or condoned a substantially
--- -· --~
J ( _ _ _ ._
di scr irni natory work en vi ronrnent, regardless of whether the corn-

- -

----

-

~--------------------~
proper course was to remand on this issue.
I do not think that
the stark,

unexplained, ambiguous finding of the DC that if re-

spondent and Taylor engaged in sexual relations, they were volun-

~

tary, can possibly stand as dispositive of the sexual harassment

/

claim. The CA stated that under Bundy, the DC was to determine
whether

respondent

was

subjected

sults,""derneaning propositions"

to

"sexually stereotyped

in-

or

"unwelcorned sexual advances"

that poisoned the work environment.

The EEOC guidelines consider

in addition "other

verbal

or

physical conduct of a sexual na-

ture."
the issue whether two people had a "voluntary" relationship, and
without analysis of these issues a DC has simply not evaluated a
claim of harassment.

Further, it simply is not clear to me what

,...-,
· ~

'-

page .L-'·

"voluntary" means here, and in light of the fact that the legal
nature of
ruled,

a

sexual

harassment claim was

not clear when the DC

and in light of the fact that the CA had only a partial

transcript and may have felt constrained in overturning this as
clearly erroneous,
determination.

I

see no reason to interfere with its remand

Upholding the remand changes nothing with respect

to Title VII law,

but does ensure that DC's do their job right,

and that this case is evaluated properly.
here goes

The Government's brief

to some lengths to argue that if this Court examines

the record as a whole there is no way that a claim of discrimination was stated;

if that is so, the DC on remand will be able to

determine that quickly enough, and I

cannot begin to understand

why this Court should examine the record on this issue.
in passing,

that

I note,

the Court did not grant cert on the

issue of

whether the voluntariness finding precludes a finding of liability here.

On a question that is presented,

I disagree with the

CA that "voluntariness had no materiality whatsoever."
as

an evidentiary matter

can save for

such a

another day,

statement is silly.

Simply,
The Court

the precise way that "voluntariness"

might fit into a harassment claim, but surely such evidence must
be

admissible

to explain who might have had a

"causing" the discriminatory atmosphere.

greater

part in

Similarly, I think the

CA was wrong that evidence of respondent's dress and discussions
with other workers

"had no place in this

litigation.~_''

Again,

it

seems an elementary point that admitting evidence in no way implies

that such evidence will be accorded great weight or will

determine the outcome.

Such evidence is surely relevant to de-

page

ciding

the

nature

of

the

work

environment

and

how

it

.L,j.

got

created.s
D. Mootness and Respondent's Suggestion to DIG
I am not persuaded by respondent's argument, as well as the
argument

of

dismissed

some

as

amici,

that

improvidently

the writ

granted.

--·-- -· -- ---......_.--

of
The

certiorari should be
case

--

presents

legal

questions_, and whatever factual problems exist can be cleared up
on re~d.

.....
A greate~on~~ whether the case i ~ moo S
~--

..__.

~

Since

the DC twice did not allow respondent to amend her complaint to
make

a

constructive

discharge

claim,

and

respondent

no

longer

works for the bank, it is not clear to me what relief she could
get

if she wins.

Although the DC opinion is again not crystal

clear, it is clear enough that it found that the firing was not
sexually motivated;

-

therefore there could be no back pay, rein-

~

statement, etc.

Amicus AFL-CIO suggests that on remand the DC

could still allow an amendment to the complaint so it is at least
uncertain at this

time what

remedy could follow.

In addition,

several cases have made the curious remark that someone could get
"nominal

damages"

and

"attorneys'

fees."

For

reasons

flowing

from this Court's circulated decisions in Bender and Diamond rel-

SI think, however, that the<:A was clearly correct in ruling
that evidence tending to show harassment of other women working
alongside respondent is pla1n y re evan 1n a arassme
't. }
As the CA stated "Even a woman who was never herself the object
of harassment might have a Title VII claim is she were fo ced to
work in an atmosp ere 1n whic sue harassment was pervasive.
Th ,
en, o
e, wa ano er way 1n w 1c
e
ailed to
properly assess the environmental issue. This issue is not
before the Court, and the DC on remand could, of course, taken
new evidence on it.

7

i-Jctge

ative to attorneys'
torneys'

.1.'!.

fees and standing, I do not believe that at-

fees prevent the case from becoming moot.

With respect

to "nominal damages," I have examined the several cases that seem
to suggest that they would be possible, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251,

253 n.

1

(CA4 1983), and I

agree with amicus AFL-CIO

that "the question of whether such relief should be permitted is
at

least

a

substantial

legal question

in

its

own right,

never

decided by the Court and not yet addressed in this case by the
lower courts." AFL-CIO Amicus, at 24.

My own view is that such a

remedy is probably not available because courts are not empowered
to grant remedies not provided for in the statute in question.

I

think

I

you may want

to ask about mootness

at oral argument.

probably come down agreeing with the AFL-CIO that "it will not be
evident until after the remand whether there
able to Vinson

is~

if she prevails on the merits."

relief avail-

It is conceiv-

able, though not likely, that the DC will now let Vinson add her
constructive discharge claim.
III. CONCLUSION
As pointed out in the brief of the Women's Bar Associations,
sexual

harassment

at

the

work

place

has

been shown by various

reliable studies to be a serious problem in this country. That is
apparently why Congress acted.

I recommend that the decision of

the CADC be affirmed insofar as it holds that sexual harassment
states a claim under Title VII,

and that the supervisor's acts

1

r/
can be imputed to the employer.
J

evidentiary points.

--~

C

page

~~.

/

I recommend reversal on the two
I

~
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1979

MERITOR SAVINGS BANK, FSB, PETITIONER v.
MECHELLE VINSON ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[April - , 1986]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents important questions concerning claims
of workplace "sexual harassment" brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e et seq.
I
In 1974, respondent Michelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a
vice president of what is now petitioner Meritor Savings
Bank (the bank) and manager of one of its branch offices.
When respondent asked whether she might obtain employment at the bank, Taylor gave her an application, which she
completed and returned the next day; later that same day
Taylor called her to say that she had been hired. With Taylor as her supervisor, respondent started as a teller-trainee,
and thereafter was promoted to teller, head teller, and assistant branch manager. She worked at the same branch for
four years, and it is undisputed that her advancement there
was based on merit alone. In September ·1978, respondent
notified Taylor that she was taking sick leave for an indefinite
period. On November 1, 1978, the bank discharged her for
excessive use of that leave.
Respondent brought this action against Taylor and the
bank, claiming that during her four years at the bank she had
"constantly been subjected to sexual harassment" by Taylor
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in violation of Title VII. She sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank,
and attorney's fees.
At the 11-day bench trial, the parties presented conflicting
testimony about Taylor's behavior during respondent's employment.* Respondent testified that during her probationary period as a teller-trainee, Taylor treated her in a fatherly way and made no sexual advances.
Shortly
thereafter, however, he invited her out to dinner and, during
the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a motel to
have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of wha t
she described as fear of losing her job she eventually agreed.
According to respondent, Taylor thereafter made repeateddemands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch,
both during and after business hours; she estimated that over
the next several years she had intercourse with him some 40
or 50 times. In addition, respondent testified that Taylor
fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the
women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.
These activities ceased after 1977, respondent stated, when
she started going with a steady boyfriend.
Respondent also testified that Taylor touched and fondled
other women employees of the bank, and she attempted to
call witnesses to support this charge. But while some supporting testimony apparently was admitted without objection, the District Court did not allow her "to present wholesale evidence of a pattern and practice relating to sexual
advances to other female employees in her case in chief, but
advised her that she might well be able to present such evidence in rebuttal to the defendants' cases." Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 37, 38-39, n. 1 (D DC
1980). Respondent did not offer such evidence in rebuttal.
1

•Like the Court of Appeals, this Court was not provided a compete
transcript of the trial. We therefore rely largely on the District Court's
opinion for the summary of the relevant testimony.
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Finally, Respondent testified that because she was afraid of
Taylor she never reported his harassment to any of his supervisors and never attempted to use the bank's complaint
procedure.
'
Taylor denied respondent's allegations of sexual activity,
testifying that he never fondled her, never made suggestive
remarks to her, never engaged in sexual intercourse with her
and never asked her to do so. He contended instead that respondent made her accusations in response to a business-related dispute. The bank also denied respondent's allegations
and asserted that any sexual harassment by Taylor was unknown to the bank and engaged in without its consent or
approval.
The District Court denied relief, but did not resolve the
conflicting testimony about the existence of a sexual relationship between respondent and Taylor. It found instead that
"If [respondent] and Taylor did engage in an intimate
or sexual relationship during the time of [respondent's]
employment with [the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution." Id., at 42 (footnote omitted).
The court ultimately found that respondent "was not the victim of sexual harassment and was not the victim of sexual discrimination" while employed at the bank. I d., 43.
Although it concluded that respondent had not proved a violation of Title VII, the District Court nevertheless went on
to address the bank's liability. After noting the bank's express policy against discrimination, and finding that neither
respondent nor any other employee had ever lodged a complaint about sexual harassment by Taylor, the court ultimately concluded that "the bank was without notice and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor." Id.,
at 42.
The Court of Appeals for the District of .Columbia Circuit
reversed. 753 F. 2d 141 (1985). Relying on its earlier hold-
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ing in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F. 2d 934 (1981), decided after
the trial in this case, the court stated that a violation of Title
VII may be predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and harassment
that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile
or offensive working environment. The court drew additional support for this position from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985), which set out these
two types of sexual harassment claims. Believing that "Vinson's grievance was clearly of the [hostile environment]
type," and that the District Court had not considered
whether a violation of this type had occurred, the court concluded that a remand was necessary.
The court further concluded that the District Court's finding that any sexual relationship between respondent and
Taylor "was a voluntary one" did not obviate the need for a
remand. "[U]ncertain as to precisely what the [district]
court meant" by this finding, the Court of Appeals held that if
the evidence otherwise showed that "Taylor made Vinson's
toleration of sexual harassment a condition of her employment," her voluntariness "had no materiality whatsoever."
753 F. 2d, at 146. The court then surmised that the District
Court's finding of voluntariness might have been based on
"the voluminous testimony regarding respondent's dress and
personal fantasies," testimony that the Court of Appeals believed "had no place in this litigation." I d., at 146, n. 36.
As to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that an
employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced
by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew
or should have known about the misconduct. The court relied chiefly on Title VII's definition of "employer" to include
"any agent of such a person," 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), as well
as on the EEOC guidelines. The court held that a supervisor is an "agent" of his employer for Title VII purposes, even
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if he lacks authority to hire, fire, or promote, since "the mere

existence-or even the appearance-of a significant degree of
influence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the
opportunity to impose on employees." 753 F. 2d, at 150.
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the
case for further proceedings. A subsequent suggestion for
rehearing en bane was denied, with three judges dissenting.
760 F. 2d 1330 (1985). We granted certiorari, 474 U. S . (1985), and now affirm but for different reasons.
II
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives. 110
Cong. Rec. 2,577-2,584 (1964). The principal argument in
opposition to the amendment was that "sex discrimination"
was sufficiently different from other types of discrimination
that it ought to receive separate legislative treatment. See
110 Cong. Rec. 2,577 (1964) (Statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States Department of Labor); id., at
2,584 (statement of Rep. Green). This argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left
with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the
the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on "sex."
Respondent argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that
unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or hostile working environment violate Title VII. Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
"discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex. Petitioner apparently
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does not challenge this proposition. It contends instead that
in prohibiting discrimination with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment, Congress
was concerned with what petitioner describes as "tangible
loss" of "an economic character," not "purely psychological
aspects of the workplace environment." Brief for the Petitioner 30-31. In support of this claim petitioner observes
that in both the legislative history of Title VII and this
Court's Title VII decisions, the focus has been on tangible,
economic barriers erected by discrimination.
We reject petitioner's view. First, the language of Title
VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination.
The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
evinces a Congressional intent " 'to strike at the entire spec:"
trum of disparate treatment of men and women'" in employment. City of Los Angeles Department ofWater and Power
v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1977), quoting Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971).
Petitioner has pointed to nothing in the Act to suggest that
Congress contemplated the limitation urged here.
Second, in 1980 the EEOC issued guidelines specifying
that "sexual harassment," as there defined, is a form of sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. As an "administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,"
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 433-434 (1971),
these guidelines, "'while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance,'" General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141-142 (1976), quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). The EEOC guidelines fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII.
In defining "sexual harassment," the guidelines first describe the kinds of workplace conduct that may be actionable
under Title VII. These include "[u]nwelcome sexual ad-
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vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 29 CFR § 1604.1l(a). Relevant to the charges at issue in this case, the guidelines
provide that such sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited
"sexual harassment," whether or not it is directly linked to
the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where "such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment."
§ 1604.11(a)(3).
In concluding that so-called "hostile environment" (i. e.,
non quid pro quo) harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC
drew upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC
precedent holding that Title VII affords employees the right
to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. See generally 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676
(1980). Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U. S. 957 (1972), was apparently the first case to
recognize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work
environment. In Rogers, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that a Hispanic complainant could establish a
Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environment for employees by giving
discriminatory service to its Hispanic clientele. The court
explained that an employee's protections under Title VII extend beyond the economic aspects of employment:
"[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic
or racial discrimination. . . . One can readily envision
working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers . . . ."
454 F. 2d, at 238.
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Courts applied this principle to harassment based on race,
e. g., Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St.
Louis, 549 F. 2d 506, 514-515 (CA8), cert. denied, 434 U. S.
819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F. 2d 169, 176
(CADC 1976), religion, e. g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424
F. Supp. 157 (SD Ohio 1976), and national origin, e. g.,
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F. 2d 87,
88 (CA8 1977). Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile
environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment
should not be. likewise prohibited. The guidelines thus appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the
existing caselaw.
Since the guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly.
held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation
of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment. As the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit wrote in Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 902 (1982):
"Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the
arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that
racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a guantlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work
and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting
as the harshest of racial epithets."
Accord, Katz v. Dole, 709 F. 2d 251, 254-255 (CA4 1983);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F. 2d, at 943-944; Zabkowicz v. West
Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (ED Wise. 1984).
Of course, as the courts in both Rogers and Henson recognized, not all workplace conduct that may be described as
"harassment" affects a ''term, condition, or privilege" of employment within the meaning of Title VII. See Rogers,
supra, at 238 ("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not
affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant
1
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degree to violate Title VII); Henson, supra, at 904 (quoting
same). For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive ''to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment." Ibid. Respondent's allegations in this
case-which include not only pervasive harassment but also
criminal conduct of the most serious nature-are plainly sufficient to state a claim for "hostile environment" sexual
harassment.
The question remains, however, whether the District
Court's ultimate finding that respondent "was not the victim
of sexual harassment," 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA), at
43, effectively disposed of respondent's claim. The Court of
Appeals recognized, we think correctly, that this ultimate
finding was likely based on one of two erroneous views of the
law. First, the District Court apparently believed that a
claim for sexual harassment will not lie absent an economic
effect on the complainant's employment. See ibid. ("It is
without question that sexual harassment of female employees
in which they are asked or required to submit to sexual demands as a condition to obtain employment or to obtain promotions falls within the protection of Title VII.") (emphasis
added). Since it appears that the District Court made its
findings without ever considering the "hostile environment"
theory of sexual harassment, the Court of Appeals' decision
to remand was correct.
Second, the District Court's conclusion that no actionable
harassment occurred might have rested on its earlier "finding" that "[i]f [resp] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or
sexual relationship . . . , that relationship was a voluntary
one." I d., at 42. But the fact that sex-related conduct was
"voluntary," in the sense that the complainant was not forced
to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of
any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome." 29 CFR § 1604.11(a). While the
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question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome
presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on
credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact, the
District Court in this case erroneously focused on the "voluntariness" of respondent's participation in the claimed sexual
episodes. The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.
Petitioner contends that even if this case must be remanded to the District Court, the Court of Appeals erred in
one of the terms of its remand. Specifically, the Court of
Appeals stated that testimony about respondent's "dress and
personal fantasies," 753 F. 2d, at 146, n. 36, which the District Court apparently admitted into evidence, "had no place
in this litigation." Ibid. The apparent ground for this conclusion was that respondent's voluntariness vel non in submitting to Taylor's advances was immaterial to her sexual harassment claim. While "voluntariness" in the sense of
consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that
a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she
found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC
guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine
the existence of sexual harassment in light of "the record as a
whole" and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature
of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
incidents occurred." 29 CFR § 1604.11(b). Respondent's
claim that any marginal relevance of the evidence in question
was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice is the
sort of argument properly addressed to the District Court.
In this case the District Court concluded that the evidence
should be admitted, and the Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion was based upon the erroneous, categorical view that
testimony about provocative dress and publicly expressed
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sexual fantasies "had no place in this litigation." 753 F. 2d,
at 146, n. 36. While the District Court must carefully weigh
the applicable considerations in deciding whether to admit
evidence of this kind, there is no per se rule against its
admissibility.
III
Although the District Court concluded that respondent had
not proved a violation of Title VII, it nevertheless went on to
consider the question of the bank's liability. Finding that
"the bank was without notice" of Taylor's alleged conduct,
and that notice to Taylor was not the equivalent of notice to
the bank, the court concluded that the bank therefore could
not be held liable for Taylor's alleged actions. The Court of
Appeals took the opposite view, holding that an employer is
strictly liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor's sexual advances, even though the employer neither
knew nor reasonably could have known of the alleged misconduct. The court held that a supervisor, whether or not he
possesses the authority to hire, fire, or promote, is necessarily an "agent" of his employer for all Title VII purposes, since
"even the appearance" of such authority may enable him to
impose himself on his subordinates.
The parties and amici suggest several different standards
for employer liability. Respondent, not surprisingly, defends the position of the Court of Appeals. Noting that Title
VII's definition of "employer" includes any "agent" of the employer, she also argues that "so long as the circumstance is
work-related, the supervisor is the employer and the employer is the supervisor." Brief for Respondent 27. Notice
to Taylor that the advances were unwelcome, therefore, was
notice to the bank.
Petitioner argues that respondent's failure to use its established grievance procedure, or to otherwise put it on notice of
the alleged misconduct, insulates petitioner from liability for
Taylor's wrongdoing. A contrary rule would be unfair, petitioner argues, since in a hostile environment harassment case
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the employer often will have no reason to know about, or
opportunity to cure, the alleged wrongdoing.
The EEOC, in its brief as amicus curiae, contends that
courts formulating employer liability rules should draw from
traditional agency principles. Examination of those principles has led the EEOC to the view that where a supervisor
exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by making or threatening to make decisions affecting
the employment status of his subordinates, such actions are
properly imputed to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to undertake them. Brief
for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae 22. Thus, the courts
have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether
or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved
of the supervisor's actions. E. g., Anderson v. Methodist
Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F. 2d 723, 725 (CA6 1972).
The EEOC suggests that when a sexual harassment claim
rests exclusively on a "hostile environment" theory, however, the usual basis for a finding of agency will often disappear. In that case, the EEOC believes, agency principles
lead to
"a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment
had reasonably available an avenue of complaint regarding such harassment, and, if available and utilized,
whether that procedure was reasonably responsive to
the employee's complaint. If the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not take
advantage of that procedure, the employer should be
shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the
sexually hostile environment (obtained, e. g., by the filing of a charge with the EEOC or a comparable state
agency). In all other cases, the employer will be liable if
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it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if, considering all the facts of the case, the victim in question had no
reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint known to appropriate management officials."
ld., at 26.
As respondent points out, this suggested rule is in some tension with the EEOC guidelines, which hold an employer liable for the acts of its agents without regard to notice. 29
CFR § 1604.11(c). The guidelines do require, however, an
"examin[ation] of the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a
supervisory or agency capacity." Ibid.
This debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability has a rather abstract quality about it given the .s tate of
the record in this case. We do not know at this stage
whether Taylor made any sexual advances toward respondent at all, let alone whether those advances were unwelcome,
whether they were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a condition of employment, or whether they were "so pervasive
and so long continuing ... that the employer must have become conscious of [them]," Taylor v. Jones, 653 F. 2d 1193,
1197-1199 (CAB 1981) (holding employer liable for racially
hostile working environment based on constructive
knowledge).
We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but we do agree with the
EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title
VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any
"agent" of an employer, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), surely
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always
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automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency
§§ 219-237 (1958). For the same reason, absence of notice to
an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from
liability. Ibid.
Finally, we reject petitioner's view that the mere existence
of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination,
coupled with respondent's failure to invoke that procedure,
must insulate petitioner from liability. While those facts are
plainly relevant, the situation before us demonstrates why
they are not necessarily dispositive. Petitioner's general
nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassmen,t
in particular, and thus does not alert employees to their employer's interest in correcting that form of discriminati<m.J. A. 25. Moreover, the bank's grievance procedure apparently required an employee to complain first to her supervisor, in this case Taylor. Since Taylor was the alleged perpetrator, it is not altogether surprising that respondent failed
to invoke the procedure and report her grievance to him.
Petitioner's contention that respondent's failure should insulate it from liability might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward.
IV

In sum, we hold that a claim of "hostile environment" sex
discrimination is actionable under Title VII, that the District
Court's findings were insufficient to dispose of respondent's
hostile environment claim, and that the District Court did not
err in admitting testimony about respondent's sexually provocative speech and dress. As to employer liability, we conclude that the Court of Appeals was wrong to disregard
agency principles and impose absolute liability on employers
for the acts of their supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular case.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Re: Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
No. 84-1979
Dear Bill:
I
share John's reservation with
respect to part III of your draft
opinion
regarding
the
employer's
for
the
conduct
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liability
I hope you will consider
supervisor.
accomodating this concern.

1

Since ~ly

Justice Rehnquist
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 24, 1986

Re:

84-1979 - Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

Dear Bill:
Although I agree with most of your draft opinion, I
have serious reservations about the conclusion of Part III
with respect to the employer's liability for the conduct of
a supervisor.
As I understand the cases, the Courts of Appeals are
unanimous in holding that there is strict liability in the
"quid pro quo" type of case, as in other Title VII cases,
but the rule is less certain in a "hostile environment" type
of case. It would seem to me to make a good deal of sense
to have the same rule apply to both kinds of cases because
as a matter of statutory construction, it seems doubtful
that Congress would have intended different rules to apply
to the two Title VII claims. I assume that there will be a
good many situations in which the plaintiff's claims will
involve a mixture of both. Moreover, in the hostile
environment type of case, it would seem to me that normal
principles of agency law would impose liability on the
employer for conditions that fell squarely within the
responsiblity of the supervisor. Accordingly, instead of
leaving the issue in some doubt, I would favor giving our
appro val to the rule that Courts of Appeals have pretty well
already developed, namely that the employer is strictly
liable for the conduct of the supervisor concerning the
environment and the employees that are directly under his or
her supervision. See e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d
599, 603-606 (CA7 1985).
Apart from this concern, I am prepared to join your
opinion.

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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Dear John:
I am willing to make a sixth vote, but not a fifth one,
for the position on employer's absolute liability for
hostile environment which you expound in your letter of
April 24th.
type of
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Sincerely,

Just ice Stevens
cc:
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April 26, 1986

Bob

No.84-1979

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 84-1979

I have read Justice Rehnquist's draft, and think you could
join it, although I share the reservations expressed in Justice
Stevens' memo.

I know that you were skeptical about the hostile

environment claim here, but

the circulating draft does no more

than remand on that issue.
I also agree, however, with the point made by Justice
Stevens with respect to the liability issue.

It is almost

meaningless to say that the decision should be made according to
agency principles.

Note that there is no dispute in the area of

guid pro guo discrimination that the employer is liable for the

acts of the supervisor.

Thus, we do not permit the employer to

escape liability in this context by saying that firing for
failure to submit to a sexual relationship was beyond the scope
of the authority of the supervisor, and therefore the employer is
not liable for the act.

The employer is liable. I cannot

understand why there would be a different rule in the "hostile
environment" context.

In addition, to deny liability in some

cases of hostile environment means that certain charges would go
without any effective remedy, since if the supervisor is found
not to be acting as an "agent" he is not covered by Title VII.
This would be a bad result because such logic would necessarily
apply in the race context as well.

Finally, there is another

very good reason not to hopelessly complicate the scope of
liability here, and that is that we are not talking about openended, large monetary

penalties for violations of Title VII;

rather, we are simply talking about giving an employee who has
been subjected to a hostile environment a meaningful remedy in
the form of an injunction against the employer.
Justice Rehnquist has indicated that he will make a sixth
vote but not a fifth for the position on absolute employer
liability.

That must mean, at least, that he too sees the merit

in it, but simply is not willing to make a Court on the issue.
Thus, I think your position on the issue will be an important
one.

Were you to indicate agreement with the position taken by

Justice Stevens, my guess is there would be a Court for employer
liability for supervisors' conduct.

That would be my preference.

On the other hand you may simply want to join what Justice

Reghnquist has circulated as you hinted was your preliminary
inclination in our telephone discussion of 4/25.
I do not recall specifically discussing this particular
aspect of the case, thus your views may be very well set.
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Justice Rehnquist
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Dear Bill:
In due course, I shall circulate a dissent in this
one.
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